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Paper considers the foundations, results and perspectives of transition process in Serbia. The 
foundations were the postulates of neoclassical economics, the mainstream in recent economic 
thought. They determined the goal, the methodology, and the ideological basis of this process, 
and resulted especially in Washington Consensus. The results of the reforms, based on 
Consensus, showed, with some exceptions, that Serbia, as the other former socialist countries, 
realized deep and long-term economic fall, followed by similar processes in other spheras. 
Contrary to ordinary opinions that transition crisis show as result of inconsistency in reforms 
taking, the paper argues that this is normally its result. As an analogue is the Morgenthau’s plan 
for West Germany observed, that has promoted Germany to industrial disarmament, and that 
would lead to its poverty and its transformation into raw material basis for the developed 
economies, and to impossibility of survival of the existing number of population. Fortunately for 
the Germany, Morgenthau’s plan was abandoned and Marshall’s plan was introduced. It leads to 
industrial renewal of Germany. For the transition countries it is also necessary, considering the 
practice and basic principles of the Other Canon, which have they, origins as far as from the 
economic policy of Henry VII, to access re-industrialization in the same way, which is the 
necessity for renewal of economies, and for overcoming the long-term crisis. 
Key words: Washington Consensus, Other Canon, Industrialization, Morgenthau’s Plan, 
Marshall’s Plan. 
INTRODUCTION 
 More than twenty years of the implementing reforms in transition process in eastern 
Europe made too many evidences for a comprehensive estimation of this process. The 
foundations and the results of transition can be objective observed and the perspectives for these 
countries concluded. After the catastrophic decade of 1990’s, the beginning of XXI century 
brought the encouraging tendencies in the most of these countries ‒ the results (production and 
living standard) from the years of pre-transition were reached in the middle of first decade 
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(figure 1). But the recent financial and economic crisis shows how much these countries are far 
from promised prosperity and welfare. 
 The long-term crisis of transitional economies (and societies) requires the serious 
examination the foundations of transition process and the search ways for their development. The 
purpose of this paper is to consider both of these aims, with special attempt to present the results 
of transition process in Serbia. 
 The new development strategy for Serbia must consider the ideas of alternative economic 
theory, that is derived from the other canon which have its origins as far from the economic 
policy of Henry VII. So, these countries can acess re-industrialization, which is the necessity for 
renewal of economies, and for overcoming the long-term crisis. 
2. FOUNDATIONS OF TRANSITION PROCE The Fall of the Berlin Wall 1989 and the end 
of cold war are certainly the most significient events at the end of the XX century. They lead the 
countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe to a fundamental problem: how to make a 
transition from planned towards market-based economy, but they also created an ambient, in 
which it would be possible to discuss, without prejudice and ideological burden, among the 
others the role of the State in economic development. Unfortunately, the mainstream economics’ 
thought – as a result of the standard assumptions of neoclassical theory – hampered this 
consideration of two fundamentally different economic outlooks: a production-centered and 
activistic-idealistic (Renaissance) tradition and a barter-centered and passivistic-materialistic 
tradition of Smith, Ricardo and neo-classical economics (Reinert 1999: 270). 
 Without pre-made recipes for development of market institutions and market economy, 
or, as it was the case with Yugoslav experience since the 1950s, simply supressed, creators of the 
changes in this countries accepted foreign experts and recipes issued by international financial 
institutions with IMF in front. In their basis were neo-classical postulates, ideas of “natural 
harmony” created by the market mechanism, that recent make the core mainstream in economic 
thought. “Natural harmony”, or a world void of any systemic effects, world of Samuelson's 
factor price equalisation (Samuelson 1948), will make all wage earners of the whole world 
equally rich – if we can only “get the prices right” and “provide a level playing field”. The 
dominance of neoclassical economics was the decisive factor in determining the transition 
strategy. Consequently, there was no debate on goal, method and ideology underpinning the 
transition process. 
 Recommended prescriptions were geografically and historically specific and were meant 
to solve problems of Latin America. However, former socialist countries have they accept, as 
well as the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Quickly, they were became “the general wisdom for 
growth and development policy“ (Marangos 2009: 197). These recipes are known as Washington 
Consensus, the term coined by J. Wiliamson in 1989 (Wiliamson 1990), with next policies (table 
1). Reformers in these countries, and their advisors, emphasized that transition would bring 
temporary crisis, and then, very soon, the economies would renewal, and their new ownership 
structure quick compensation for the temporary decrease and then a quick growth and catching 
up with developed countries. 
Table 1. Original and augmented Washington Consensus 
 
Original Washington Consensus "Augmented" Washington Consensus, the 
previous 10 items, plus: 
1. Fiscal discipline 11. Corporate governance 
2. Reorientation of public expenditures 12. Anti-corruption 
3. Tax reform 13. Flexible labor markets 
4. Financial liberalization 14. WTO agreements 
5. Unified and competitive exchange rates 15. Financial codes and standards 
6. Trade liberalization 16. “Prudent”capital-account opening 
7. Openness to FDI 17. Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes 
8. Privatization 18. Independent central banks/inflation targeting 
9. Deregulation 19. Social safety nets 
10. Secure Property Rights 20. Targeted poverty reduction 
Source: (Williamson 1990); (Rodrik 2003; 2006) 
 
 The goal of reforms had to be competitive capitalism, the methodology neoclassical 
economics, and the ideological foundation self-interest. The individual conditions of each 
country was not in concern. The debate on transition was restricted to the speed of reform. The 
only concern was whether transition economies should immediately liberalise, stabilise, and 
privatise, that required so-called shock-therapy approach, or implement the neoclassical policies 
gradualistic, at a slow pace (gradualist approach). 
 But, as was shown in (Marangos 2002), debate between the supporters of two 
approaches, in fact was immaterial. Both approaches adopted a combination of shock-therapy 
and gradualist strategies. In Serbia, this was also the case, although the transition process had 
many special characteristics, as a result of the known events in the 1990’s. 
 What mean principles of Washington Consensus? Let we see. 
1) Means that public revenues should cover public expenditures, because budget deficit lead 
to inflation and to balance of payments deficit. 
2) This suggested switching expenditure, in a progrowth and propoor way, from things like 
nonmerit subsidies to basic health care, education, and infrastructure. 
3) The aim is a tax system that would combine a broad tax base with moderate marginal tax 
rates. This would increase fiscal, and then total public revenues. 
4) If exist control of interest rates, it must be cancelled. 
5) Central Bank has to ensure that appreciated domestic currency does not jeopardize the 
competitiveness of domestic economy in external trade. 
6) As a general approach, without pointing out the swiftness of its application. 
7) It does not refer to comprehensive capital account, but only to FDI, in the meaning that 
all foreigners should be able to invest, build or buy something, and should be able to do 
that without limitations. 
8) It is assumed that privatization, if conducted properly, is beneficial, whether privatized 
enterprises do business in competitive market, whether they are regulated. 
9) It refers, primarily, to removal of barriers to entry given market, which increases 
competition, as well as the exit barriers for firms, not а removal regulation of safety of 
production, ecology regulation, or economic regulation in case of natural monopolies. 
10) It is necessary to ensure to gain property rights at an acceptable cost. 
 Is this set of policies acceptable? Williamson emphasized uniqueness of 1989 
(Williamson 2003: 11), and critics of Consensus emphasized that some of the important policies 
are missing, for example social equality and institutional development. This is unquestionable, 
and Williamson later supplemented the program, and named it After the Washington Consensus 
(Williamson 2006). However, it’s important to estimate original policies, because they were 
practically implemented. It’s clear that in these evaluations couldn’t be (and shouldn’t be) a 
consensus, but still, surprisingly, there are many our economists that fully support these policies. 
In my opinion, uncritical relation toward policies of the Consensus can’t be good – they must be 
considered individually in the context of specific economy and concrete period of time. 
 The ideas from the Consensus had a huge influence on the economic reforms of many 
countries, among them on postcommunist, although the way these countries interpreted these 
ideas varied significantly. However, the orginal policies reigned unchallenged for only a short 
time. International economic and political circumstances has been changed, as well as domestic 
condition in reforming countries. So appeared new problems and the original proponents of the 
Consensus had to search for new answers. These answers often complemented the original 
recommendations of the Consensus, but not always. Also, new goals, more complex and 
difficult, were constantly added to the list of requirements, so the final frontier of the reform 
process became mere preconditions for success. 
 
3. RESULTS OF THE TRANSITION PROCESS IN SERBIA 
 Through the reforms, the institutional ambient has been radically changed: for most 
prices a free price system was introduced, foreign exchange was liberalized, subsidies were cut, 
currencies were devaluated and made convertable, restrictive credit policy was introduced, 
borders were open for foreign capital, most of the state-owned enterprises were privatized. In 
most cases, it is all done by “shock therapy” (all, right now, at the same time). The applied model 
assumed that the market institutions would spontaneously lead to capitalism, as soon as the 
ownership was privatized, prices were free, currency was stabilized and free competitive market 
was established. The economy should, after a short period of crisis, spontaneously lead to the 
renewal of production and economic growth. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. GDP of Serbia 
 
 
 
Source: (NSPO 2013) 
 
 These changes, however, weren’t backed with proper and suitable changes in real sector. 
The results achieved are well known, and there is no point in repeating them here. They 
undoubtedly show failure. 
 The implementation of reforms prescribed in Consensus and after gave not expected 
results: instead of the promised prosperity, the majority of countries measured a great and a long-
term fall in GDP, industrial production and living standard. Serbia was not an exception – its 
GDP fell almost 30% of its value in 1989. Figure 1 shows data series of GDP (for period 1989–
2012), without, as the other data in this paper, the data for the Autonomous Province Kosovo i 
Metohija, and GDP for 28 transition countries1. 
 Greatest losses were in industry. The industrial output in 2012 is on the level of 39% 
related to 1989 (figure 2), many branches drastically decreased output, and some seized to exist.2 
As the industry is moving force of technological progress, an engine to economic growth and 
creator of synergetic effects in all economy (Serra 1613), this presentation of its decrease is by 
itself enough to mark the whole period as “negative”. 
                                                          
1 Albania, Azerbaijan, Belorus, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Estonia, Georgia, Croatia, 
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Latvia, Litva, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldavia, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 
2 It is great drop 1999, a year of NATO bombing. That factor and others during the 1990s (economic sanctions, wars 
in the surrounding republics) are not to be underestimated. However, a drastic drop of industrial output is clear. 
Figure 2. Industrial output in Serbia (1989=100) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on (РЗС 2010; 2012) 
 
 In most transition countries, the economic crisis was followed by other negative 
consequences, such as a great demographic crisis – decline in population, spread of the diseases, 
a drop in fertility, increase in mortality. The depth of demographic crisis is probably best 
illustrated by the Russian Cross, detected in 1992 in Russia: curves of dynamics of live births 
and deaths were crossed. This happened in Serbia in same year (figure 3), with constantly 
increased gap. 
 Transition resulted in great social expenses – increased poverty, unemployment and 
inequality, aggravation of public services and their polarization, criminal, increase in corruption 
and citizen unrest. Finally, we should point out vast external obligations, which happened in 
spite of great privatization revenues and great inflow of foreign remittance. Estimations of all 
inflows (privatization, foreign direct investments, foreign remittances) are different, from 30 
even to 70 billions euro, only for the period since 2000. This huge inflow wasn’t directed in 
production, or to rebuild tragically underdeveloped infrastructure, but in consumption from 
import. 
 
Figure 3. Natural population changes in Serbia 1990–2011 
 
 
Source: (РЗС 2011) 
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 For this enormous consumption growth from import almost always is blamed the relative 
appreciation of RSD, but not foreign exchange liberalization which was swiftly and uncritically 
conducted at the beginning of the decade 2000s, according to requirements of Consensus. 
According this argumentation, appreciated exchange rate destimulates export and stimulates 
import. Both sides of argumentation, however, are questionable: source of inlow from which the 
foreign currency is bought and the imported goods are payed should be taken into consideration 
when we talk about import, and more detailed explanations are necessary when we talk about 
export. 
 
Figure 4. External debt of Serbia 2001–2012 (%)3 
 
Source: (НБС 2010; 2012) 
 
 It is wrongly assumed that RSD devaluation would increase competitiveness of our 
export, even if there is production that could be exported. Devaluation of RSD doesn’t change 
prices of our goods in foreign markets, so they wont be easier to export.4 It will only lead to 
redistribution between domestic manufacturers: more wealth will go to exporters (in RSD, 
nominally). Moving of export and import is not affected by nominal exchange rate, but its long 
term trend, expressed as real exchange rate (Tasić i Zdravković 2008). It is well known that 
prices in our markets, for a long time, almost automatically adjust to EUR (previously with DM), 
and react very quickly to changes in exchange rates. So the effects of changes in exchange rate of 
RSD quickly disappears, and previous constellation is established, on higher nominal value. So 
what changes? 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 In september 2010 the methodology of external debt was changed, so the data for 2010 and later for indicator 
„External debt/export of goods and services” are not comparable with previous years. 
4 Export is possible with lower export prices (damping), and exporters would be compensated with greater amounts 
of RSD. But that is not allowed, and aside from that, it would meant a spillover of value created in country. 
Figure 5. Structure of external debt of Serbia 2000–2012 (мill. €) 
 
 
Source: (НБС 2010; 2012) 
 
 Next important moment is high external indebtedness. This indicator is also unequall 
between countries, and it is comforting to say that extreme indebtedness is phenomenon that 
exists in some other countries as well (Greece). As we can see (figure 4), except in 2001, Serbia 
is, according to External debt/GDP indicator, in a group of medium indebted, although moving 
towards highly indebted countries. Second indicator (External debt/Export), excluding 2006–
2008, shows significant and belongs to highly indebted countries. (WB criteria frontiers for high 
indebtedness are 80 and 220). 
 The share of public and private sector in total debt is important. It is often emphasized as 
a (relatively) favorable circumstance. According to the official data (figure 5), it really seemed 
so. However, who can guarantee that the state (tax payers) won’t pay back debts that isn’t hers 
and wasn’t guaranteed by the state? But from 2008 situation clearly is different, so this argument 
is not relevant. 
 
 
Figure 6. Privatization revenues 2002–2012 (mil €) 
 
 
Source: [МФ 2012] 
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 There was high indebtness inspite of high revenue obtained through privatization as well 
as significant remittances from emigrants. Estimations as far as all those sources (privatization, 
FDI, remittances) differ, from some 30 USD billions to even 70, only in the period from 2000. 
See how these estimates can be proof by official data. 
 
Figure 7. Foreign direct investments 2001‒2011 (mill. eur) 
 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Serbia, in [Kovačević 2012] 
 
 According to Privatization Agency, between 2000 and 2012 the Government realized 
revenue of 3,65 billions euro (2,576 i.e. 1,076 respectively) by selling state enterprises and 
investments (see figure 6). 
 The focus on foreign direct investments, as potential initiators of redevelopment of the 
economy, was very present just after 2000. As the figure 7 shows, thanks to FDI, in the period of 
11 years, the revenue was 14.929 billions euro in total, most of which was by far received in 
2006. However, the sector structure of these investments was not favorable: the largest amount 
was invested in financial intermediation and commerce, which were followed by manufacturing 
industry. 66% of all FDI were invested in the service sector. 
 
Figure 8. Remittances in Serbia 2003‒2009 
 
 
Source: (World Bank 2011) 
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 Besides the cited sources, remittances are another important source after 2000. Without 
getting into the methodological problems of collecting data about the remittances, we will just 
cite the World Bank data (World Bank 2011). According to these data, the inflow of foreign 
remittances to Serbia is shown in Figure 8. As we see, it has been about 5.5 billion US$ per year 
in the last few years, or 34 billion US$ in period 2003‒2009. 
 This huge inflow, however, wasn’t used productively, not even for the sake of the 
(tragically) underdeveloped infrastructure. Instead, it transformed into consumption (of imported 
foods, of course, having in mind the poor state of the domestic production). Considering the 
reasons of this fact goes beyond our paper. 
4. PERSPECTIVES FOR RENEWAL AND DEVELOPMENT 
 Intensity of negative changes and, especially, longevity of negative results of the 
transition process initiate the review of the term transition crisis, or transformational recession, 
or should determinate its new meaning. However, initiators and protagonists of reforms in these 
countries don`t want do, or are not able to see at first the reforms results. Or apply some of the 
well known evading techniques in facing them.5 Basic principles and strategies are not 
questioned, and the lack of results is explained by inconsistency in handling the reform, and by 
limitations set by politics, so that it is all brought down to a mere technical problem of reform 
undertaking. In that case, all debates about causes of crisis and possible means to prevent it, are 
stopped. Why does this happen? 
Table 2. Basic characteristic of Marshall’s and Morgenthau’s plans 
Marshall’s plans Morgenthau’s plans 
Creates “improved” Exclusively creates “improved” 
Schumpeterian activities: Malthusian activities: 
(= ‘good’ export activities) (= ‘bad’ export activities if no 
Schumpeterian sector present) 
Specialising brings increasing returns / 
economies of scale 
After a certain point, specialisation will cause 
unit production costs to rise causes 
diminishing returns 
Dynamic imperfect competition „Perfect competition“ 
High growth activities Low growth activities 
Price stability Extreme price fluctuations 
Generally skilled labour Generally unskilled labour 
Creates a middle class Creates ‘feudalist’ class structure 
Irreversible wages (‘Stickiness’ of wages) Reversible wages 
Technical change leads to higher wages to the 
producer (‘Fordist wage regime’) 
Technical change tends to lower price to 
consumer 
Creates large synergies (linkages, clusters) Creates few synergies 
 
                                                          
5 See more detailed consideration in (Буквић 2011). 
Source: (Reinert 2006: 100) 
 But this debate is realy necessary. And for it to be succesfull, it must adress the core of 
the problem. The reconsideration of Consensus must be in focus, as well as its theoretical basis 
on which it was built and is sustained. Regardlessly that many countries were drawn to poverty, 
as a consequence of its recipes. So we must not think that the generall approach is good, and that 
only some of the policies and measures are bad, and not conducted properly. 
 Although Consensus was meant to solve “local problems”, their policies were soon 
accepted as a general approach for all developing countries. It is considered that it’s policies are 
enough to initiate economic growth and remove stagnation. Great role of the free market within 
set of policies is the reason it`s often called neoliberal (even “neoliberal manifesto“), although 
Williamson emphasized that it’s not right, that term neoliberalism was coined to describe 
doctrines espoused by the Mont Pelerin Society, and that there are a number of distinctively 
neoliberal doctrines that are conspicuous by their absence policies of Consensus (Wiliamson 
2003: 11).6 
 
Table 3. Means for national economic development: Source: (Reinert 2006: 44–46) 
1. Acceptance that wealth is created in relations between activities with increasing returns 
and continuous mechanization. Understanding that the state is in wrong “field of 
specialization“. Aware of policies it supports, stands for and protects these activities. 
2. Temporal monopoly should be given to these activities in certain geographic area / 
patents / and customs protections. 
3. Acceptance that economic development is synergetic fenomenon, so that diversity and 
division of labor in economy are imposed. “Maximizing labor division and number of 
jobs in country“ (A. Serra) and copying economic structure of Venice and Holland. 
4. Theoretical understanding that industrialization (and advanced service activities) 
simultaneously solve four great economic problems of poor countries: increase value 
added, increase employment, increase wages and decrease balance of payment deficit. 
5. Significance of attracting competent labor from abroad (which is more important than 
foreign capital). This was already very important in England, in the period of Tudor 
dynasty (throughout the history, many nations deprived themselves of most educated 
citizens through religious persecution). 
6. Relative oppression of large landowners. From Florence in XIII century through 
England since 1485, to South Korea after WWII. Physiocracy (the foundation of 
standard economics) was a revolt of large landowners against that kind of policy. 
7. Tax incentives for economic activities we wish to develop. 
8. Inexpensive loans for same activities. 
9. Export support for same activities. 
10. Helping to increase arable land and incentives to agriculture in general, although we 
must bear in mind that agriculture itself cannot drive the country out of poverty. 
11. Focus on education and knowledge. 
12. Patents protection for new inventions. 
                                                          
6 The origin of Neoliberalism can be found in the time of 1930s, in pre-war Germany, when the German Freiberg 
School was active (Boas & Gans-Morse 2009: 145). 
13. Export duties and export prohibitions so that raw materials would become more 
expensive for foreign industry (used in England in XVI century, with great efficiency, in 
order to break Italian textile industry). 
 Of course, we must bear in mind that “reforms were uneven and remained incomplete“, 
as in Report emphasized IMF7, which is true, although the conclusion drawn (“According to its 
authors, the problem was not with the approach taken to reform, but that it did not go deep and 
far enough.“) is questionable. From this point of view, the failures have to be chalked up to too 
little reform of the kind that Consensus has advocated all along and not to the nature of these 
reforms itself. Also, the policy implication that follows is simple: do more of the same, and do it 
well. However, what has become clearer to practitioners of the Consensus over time is that the 
standard policy reforms did not produce lasting effects if the background institutional conditions 
were poor: sound policies needed to be embedded in solid institutions. The upshot is that the 
original Consensus has been augmented by a long list of so-called “second-generation“ reforms 
that are heavily institutional in nature (table 1) (Rodrik 2003: 42; 2006: 978). 
 As the starting point, we can use the experience of the renewal of Germany after the 
WWII. Feared that Germany could once again cause war, the allies accepted in 1944 a plan that 
ought to disindustrialize and make it an agrar country. Industrial machines should be removed, 
mines closed and filled with water and cement. The Germany should be turned into a land of 
small farmers. Then it would a peacefull nation, and the closer contact to the land and agriculture 
would bring moral restoration and pacification of its people. The author of plan was H. 
Morgenthau.8 Plan became active as Germany was defeated.9 It has become obvious in 1946 and 
1947 that the plan created great problems. Former US president H. Hoover lead the team of 
experts to visit Germany and to report about the nature and the causes of problems. In the last 
report he emphasized main illusion about the development of Germany: “There is the illusion 
that the new Germany (...) can be reduced to a ͵Pastoral Stateʹ. It cannot be done unless we 
exterminate or move 25,000,000 people out of it“ (Hoover 1947: 28). Hoover’s reports 
rediscovered the core of old mercantilistic theory of population: “Industrial nation can maintain 
and nourish many people than it can agriculture state at the same place.“10 Just as A. Smith 
emphasized: “the difference is very great between the number of shepherds and that of hunters 
whom the same extent of equally fertile territory can maintain“ (Smit 1970: 869), with 
implications on defense power of the country. This means that industrialization increases country 
sustainability. 
 Morgenthau plan was quietly stopped. Instead Marshall’s plan was introduced, which 
goal was reindustrialization of Germany (and other Europe). The plan was inaugurated in june 
                                                          
7 According to (Rodrik 2006: 977). 
8 Term Morgenthau's Plan usualy is used either to designate the described agreement or to mean any postwar 
program designed to effect and preserve German disarmament by significantly reducing its industrial might (Gareau 
1961: 517). Second meaning can be enlarged to any plan that leaves out industrialization as a factor to a country 
development. 
9 See original in (Irving 1986) or more detailed description of Morgenthau's Plan in (Chase 1954). 
10 According to (Reinert 2006: 100). 
194711 with the explanation which has already been known since the beginning of XVII century 
thanks to the A. Serra, that production of raw materials and industrial production are subject to 
different laws (Serra 1952: ch. 3). These arguments were used after the WWII in favor that raw-
material production based countries also needed industrial sector. Recent mainstream in 
economic science, unfortunately, based on neoliberal dogma, forgot this opinions, and through 
its enforcers, with IMF on the head, even directly forbid the poor countries to develop industry 
forcing them on “equal“ competition with industrial developed countries. The same countries 
that used opposite policies for their development, than those enforced on poor countries. 
 Because Marshall’s plan is today wrongly identified with any plan that brings great 
resources to the poor countries, overlooking its essence – (re)industrialization, it’s necessary to 
specify its main characteristics and differences to Morgenthau’s plan (table 3). 
 It is clearly shown what measures needs to be taken, as well as the current position of 
transition countries, and Serbia. And to make everything perfectly clear, here is the list of 
measures used from the time of Henry VII in England (1485) until South Korea (1960s), later 
banned by World Bank and IMF (table 4). 
 
Table 4. Foundations of two different types of economic theory 
 
Todays mainstream theory (standard canon) The other canon (“Alternative theory“) 
Equillibrium under perfect information and 
perfect foresight 
Learning and decision-making under 
uncertanity (Schumpeter, Keynes, Shackle) 
High level of abstraction Level of abstraction chosen according to 
problem to be resolved 
Man’s wit and will absent Moving force : Geist – und Willenskapital ; 
Man’s wit and will, enterpreneurship 
Innovation and new knowledge are not the 
(inner) moving force. Moving force: “capital 
per se propels the capitalist engine“ 
Moving force: New knowledge which creates 
a demand for capital to be provided from 
financial sector. 
Metaphores are chosen from realm of 
physics. 
Metaphors are (mainly) chosen from the 
realm of biology 
Mode of understanding (is) Mechanistic 
(“begreifen”) 
Modes of understanding are Qualitative 
(“verstehen”). A type of understanding 
irreducible only to numbers and symbols 
Matter (Materialism) Will and wit (capital) (innovation and 
enterpreneurship) precedes matter. 
                                                          
11 Marshall’s expose discovers the core of the relationship between industry and agriculture: „Peasant has always 
produced food to be exchanged for other goods with the people that live in cities. This division of labor is the 
fundament of our modern civilisation. It now treatens to break. Industries in cities are not producing enough goods 
to be traded with peasants who produce food (...) Meantime, there are shortages of food and kindling material and in 
lot of places, people are getting close to starvation. (...) Modern system of the division of labor on wich commodity 
exchange is based, is in danger and could fall apart.“ (According to (Reinert 2006: 122.)) 
Focused on Man the consumer (Adam Smith: 
“Man are animals which have learned to 
barter.“) 
Focused on Man the Innovator and Producer 
(Abraham Lincoln: “Man are animals which 
not only work, but innovate.“) 
Focused on static (World as a photography) Focused on change (World as a film/movie) 
History absent, no cumulative effects Cumulative causations. History matters, 
backwash effects (Myrdal, Kaldor, 
Schumpeter, German Historical School) 
Increasing returns at large scales are not 
essential feature 
Increasing returns, or its absence, are 
essential to explaining differences in income 
between firms, regions and nations (Kaldor) 
Seeks to be very precise. (its better to be 
accurately wrong, than approximately 
correct) 
Relevance is more essential than precision. A 
core issue in the economy is trade-off 
between relevance and precision 
„Perfect competition“. (Commodity 
competiton and price competition) is an ideal 
situation for society 
Innovation and knowledge based competition 
is ideal, and engine to progress. Perfect 
competition,with equilibrium and no 
innovation makes capital worthless. 
(Schumpeter, Hayek) 
The market is a mechanism for setting prices Market is also an arena for rivalry, and a 
mechanism for selecting different products 
and solutions (Schumpeter, Nelson & 
Winter) 
Starting assumption for equality: no diversity Diversity is a key factor (Schumpeter, 
Shackle) 
Second assumption for equlity: All economic 
activities are alike, and of equal quality as 
carriers of economic growth and welfare 
Growth and welfare are activity specific. 
Different economic activities present widely 
different potentials for for absorbing new 
knowledge. 
Both theory and policy tend to be 
independant of context. (“one medicine cures 
all“) 
Both theory and policy recommendations are 
highly context dependant  
The economy is largely independant from 
society. 
The economy is firmly embedded in society 
Technology is taken as a free good, as 
“manna from heaven“ 
Knowledge and technology is produced, have 
cost and are protected. This production is 
based on incentives of the system, law, 
institutions  and policies 
Equillibrating forces are at the core of system 
and theory. 
Cumulative forces are more important than 
equillibrating ones , and should therefore be 
the core of the system 
Economy is science of harmony: Economy is 
self-regulating system seeking equillibrium 
and harmony. 
Economy is characterised by inner instability 
and conflicts. Stablity doesnt come by itself, 
it has to be based on policy measures (Carey, 
Polanyi, Weber, Keynes) 
Postulates the representative or typical firm There are no „representative firm“.All firms 
are unique (Penrose) 
Static optimum. Perfect rationality Dynamic optimization under uncertainty. 
Bounded rationality 
No distinction is made between real economy 
and financial economy. 
Conflict between real economy and financial 
economy are normal and must be regulated 
(Minsky, Keynes) 
Saving is caused by refraining from 
consumtion and a cause of growth. 
Saving largely results from profits, not by 
refraining of consumption(Schumpeter) and 
saving per se is not useful or desirable for 
growth (Keynes) 
 
Source: (Reinert 2006: 151–153) 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 The analysis of the neoclassical model in both approaches (shock therapy or gradualist) 
reveals the internal inconsistencies of each (Marangos 2002). The implementation of this model 
in either form, or its combination, had to varying degrees common outcomes. These were 
inflation, reduced output, unemployment, external imbalances, destruction of welfare system, 
corruption. Although the neoclassical economists had presented these outcomes as “short-term 
necessary adjustment”, the transition countries are, with some exceptions, still in depression. 
Contrary to ordinary opinions, that transition crisis show as result of inconsistency in reforms 
taking, we can say that this is normaly its result. The transition countries had to search, and now 
search, new paths for development and renewal its economies. Serbia is there not alone. In this 
sense, the differences between two types of economic theory (table 4) must be seriously 
considered. 
 Although it seems that the situation is clear, in reality that’s not. Not because we should 
question these arguments and ideas – it is necessary to that every time. The point is something 
else. Current trends in world are more interdependent than ever, and very few countries, 
especially not Serbia, are able to carry out its own, independent policy. Financial capital has 
more power today than ever, and is heavily bounded with states policy, especially in USA, and 
large corporations, creating so called “Oligarchic triad”12 (WallStreet + US Treasury + IMF) that 
holds true political and economic authority in whole world. 
                                                          
12 According to (Ковалик 2009: 8). 
 So, the most important question today is – could the logic of today`s modern capitalism 
(casino capitalism) i.e. financial capital, be broken? It`s not only about offered programs13, it is 
essential if there is enough social strength capable for that. Same is to be considered for Serbia – 
are there forces that could lead us from ruling (neoliberal) concept that leads to poverty, towards 
industrial oriented concept which could lead the country towards development? Much has been 
spoken about new models of development, based, among other, on renewal of industry (see e.g. 
NSPO 2013), but the question whether it’s realistic or it’s a political marketing, remains. Does 
the will and capability to pursue autonomous policy exist? It’s not clearly shown today, and the 
economic mainstream doesn’t even recognize the necessity for that. 
 If the consensus about the later could be achieved, then the development strategy should 
be chosen without prejudice. It shouldn’t be based, not on ruling mainstream, but on postulats of 
almost forgotten “Other Canon”. If that kind of objective review could be done as necessary in 
USA long before ending of WWII14, there is no real reason not to be taken today. After all, even 
renaissance economists told us that the State exists because of the systemic effects in an 
economy, wich also the early A. Smith glorifies (Smit 2008). A. Smith prior to his meetings with 
the French physiocrats. 
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